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Abstract
This exploratory paper analyzes the three-way relationship between a national reg-
ulator, an incumbent and a local authority in a context where investment in a new
infrastructure has to be undertaken. This setting is relevant for the analysis of local
investment in next generation access network in telecoms.
It is optimal to allow duplication by the local authority when the incumbent can
perfectly anticipate the local authoritys investment decision, national and local pref-
erences coincide and there is no externality between localities.
When the incumbent lacks information about the local authoritys decision, it faces
a risk of duplication. The regulator can either allow duplication, but must then com-
pensate the incumbent through a higher access tari¤, or ban duplication. The latter is
shown to dominate the former.
The advantage of a ban on duplication are less clear when local and national ob-
jectives are not aligned and we discuss the merits of various other remedies such as
authorizations or compensation to the incumbent.
We nally discuss the impact of externalities between localities, such as migrations
or returns to scale.
1 Introduction
While network industries have been open to competition by now, public intervention remains
pregnant, be it in the form of access regulation or universal service obligations to name but
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a few. Moreover, private actors in these industries must undertake substantial long-term
infrastructure investments in order to gain a competitive edge over their rivals by o¤ering
higher-quality services to customers. The protability of these investments may be a¤ected
by other variables, though. First, as hinted previously, new infrastructure networks, which
typically involve a long-term planing of the coverage deployment, may be regulated by a
national authority. Second, public investment may cannibalize the protability of private
investment; local or regional authorities may indeed consider preemptive investment schemes
to ensure the accelerated delivery of new services. This paper analyzes such a three-way
interaction between a national regulator, private actors and a local authority, in a context
where both the private sector and the local authority may invest.
As an example of primary interest, consider the telecommunications industry. Next gen-
eration access networks will allow to reach higher delivering speeds than ADSL2+ or cable
technologies. Despite the uncertainty surrounding the demand for these new services, many
decision-makers foresee in these investments the potential for a profound impact on the broad-
band market, but also on society.1 Investment costs for the deployment of these networks
and the upgrading of the existing network are substantial, though, and entail some risks for
private actors. In this context, some local public authorities or regional development agencies
have decided to build their own infrastructure in order to boost the delivery of new services
to their constituencies.
There are certainly valid reasons to allow, or sometimes encourage, these local author-
ities to develop their own network, among which market failures, distributional objectives
including equity and social inclusion, or regional competitiveness. However, as recognized by
Ofcom (2007b), ARCEP (2008) or EC (2009), there are several problems which need careful
attention. Our paper explores some of these problems.
We build a canonical model of the relationship between a national regulator, a local
authority and a private actor. The national territory is divided into districts, which di¤er
by the level of demand for new services and the cost of building a new network.
An incumbent operator contemplates the decision whether to invest in a new infrastruc-
ture in each district. Such an infrastructure can be rented to a competitive fringe of opera-
tors to provide services to customers. For the incumbent to be willing to invest, some access
markup is needed to cover the investment cost. The regulator is in charge of regulating the
access to the incumbents network.
The local authority can decide to develop its own network infrastructure, which then
decides the terms of access to the local network. The local authority is interested in the
welfare of its constituency and, in particular, can use local public funds to nance the network,
as opposed to the regulator. We assume that the local authority is a priori less e¢ cient than
the incumbent in building the new network, but since the former can use public funds it may
also set a lower access charge on its network, thereby improving customerssurplus.
The sequence of decisions is as follows. First, the regulator sets the access charge which
1See Ofcom (2007a) for instance.
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applies to the incumbents network on the national territory. Second, the incumbent decides
whether to invest. Third, the local authority may invest in, and decide the terms to access
of, a local network. Our goal is to determine the optimal regulatory regime, that is, whether
the local authority should be allowed to or banned from investing in a public network.2
Assume in a rst step that the local authoritys cost of investment is publicly known.
Then, we show that one should always allow the local authority to invest. The reason is
straightforward: under complete information, the incumbent can perfectly anticipate the
local authoritys decision and there is no ine¢ cient duplication. The regulator, in turn, can
set a regulated access tari¤ which leaves the incumbent with no extra prot, implying that
the local authoritys objective becomes aligned with the regulators. In a nutshell, delegation
of the investment decision has no social costs in this setting.
This result extends to more general situations provided that, on the one hand, the in-
cumbent and the local authority share the same information, and, on the other hand, the
regulator and the local authority share the same objective. If one of these conditions is not
satised, then the regulator may want to constraint the local authoritys intervention.
Consider now the situation in which the regulator does not know the local authoritys cost
of investment. However, that information is known by the incumbent. Suppose, moreover,
that the regulated access price, which is determined nation-wide, leaves some prots to the
incumbent if it decides to invest in the district; this is the case, for instance, under the so-
called perequation schemeswhich require the access prices to be uniform across the whole
territory.
The local authoritys cost may not be known ex ante, but can be veriable ex post. In
that case, several regimes of authorization are possible. On top of systematically allowing
duplication, the regulator can also decide on a case-by-case basis, i.e. ex post once the local
authoritys cost is known, whether the local authority is allowed to duplicate. A system-
atic authorization of duplication leads to excessive investment by the local authority, which
does not internalize the incumbents foregone prot; this deters some e¢ cient investment by
the incumbent. By contrast, a regime with ex post authorization yields too much private
investment.
A di¤erent approach for the regulator consists in constraining the local authoritys inter-
vention. This may be best suited when the local authoritys cost cannot be veried, both ex
ante and ex post. The regulator may then decide to implement a regulation of the access to
the local network as well as a reimbursement policy in the event of duplication. We isolate
conditions under which these two constraints on the local authoritys intervention may be
optimal or not.
We also show that these policies are not unrelated. In particular, when a regime with ex
post authorization prevails, then the incumbent should be compensated by the local authority
when it duplicates.
2In our companion paper (Jullien, Pouyet and Sand-Zantman 2009) we investigate the possibility that
the local authority reaches a contractual agreement with the incumbent, including subsidies, which in not
allowed here.
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We then turn our attention to a situation in which neither the national regulator nor
the incumbent are informed about the local authoritys cost of intervention. Hence, the
incumbent cannot perfectly foresee when it will be duplicated and is exposed to a risk. In
this context, duplication is no longer always e¢ cient and the regulator faces two options. A
ban on duplication removes the duplication risk faced by the incumbent, but does not allow
to benet from reduced access tari¤ when the local authority invests. By contrast, allowing
duplication forces the regulator to increase the regulated access price so as to compensate the
incumbent from the duplication risk. A priori, both policies come with their own costs and
benets. However, we prove that, if there is private investment, then a ban on duplication is
socially optimal.
We conclude our analysis with a brief consideration of externalities across districts. Two
types of externalities can be envisioned. First, scale economies may make it less costly
for the incumbent to deploy investment over the whole territory. Second, in presence of a
mobile population, which patronizes one district over the other depending on the possibility
to benet from new services, districts create externalities on each others. This situation has
some analogies with the literature on scal competition between local authorities. In these
settings, allowing duplication has, again, costs and benets.
Our paper belongs to the literature on regulation in network industries (see La¤ont and
Tirole, 2000, for instance). Our main departure is to focus on the interaction between a
regulator and a local authority, each having specic attributes; hence, our paper also is related
to the literature on the provision of local public goods. A few articles have discussed the
regulation process when di¤erent market structures are possible. In the literature focusing on
the regulation of infrastructures, the standard trade-o¤ is between granting a generous access
to the essential facility (or promoting competition at the upstream level) and recouping the
cost of investment. For example, Dana and Spier (1994) made one of the rst contributions
where the modes of production and the market structure are endogenous. Even closer to
our paper is the article of Caillaud and Tirole (2004) highlighting a conict between social
optimality and nancial viability. We also have a similar conict, but the potential competitor
is a public agency. Moreover, we analyze the role of the national regulator in mitigating this
risk by choosing the regulation rules.
The paper is organized as follows. The key ingredients of our model are exposed in
Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the benchmark case of complete information. Section 4 studies
the distortion generated by the lack of information on the regulators side, whereas Section 5
focuses on the duplication risk that arises when the incumbent lacks some information about,
and cannot predict, the local authoritys intervention. Externalities are examined in Section
6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Model
There is one representative geographical zone, called the district, characterized by its level
of demand for broadband services denoted by .
Customers located on the district may benet from a new service provided by a set of
identical rms. The provision of this service requires access to an up-to-date network. An
incumbent operator, denoted by I, has the possibility to upgrade its existing network at a
cost c > 0 to allows the provision of the service.3
Access to the infrastructure network is set on a nondiscriminatory basis and the unit
price is denoted by a. Service providers are assumed to behave competitively with a constant
marginal cost normalized to zero, so that the nal price they charge to customers is always
equal to the access charge p = a. The demand is then D (a) and we assume D (0) > 0. The
corresponding consumers surplus is denoted by W (a), with W 0(a) =  D(a). Let "(a) =
 aD0 (a) =D (a) be the price elasticity of the demand. We assume that "(a) is increasing and
" (0) = 0. As this will always be optimal to set price below the monopoly level, we restrict
attention to access price a such that " (a)  1.
Access to the incumbent network is regulated. The regulator R is in charge of the pricing
of the access to the existing network and commits to an access charge a = r prior to the
decision of the incumbent to upgrade or not.
Instead of relying on the incumbent, a local authority L, representing the constituency of
the district, may decide to build its own network. Ls cost is given by k and is distributed
on [k;+1), with k  c, according to a strictly positive density f(:) and cdf F (:). The local
authoritys objective is to maximize the welfare of its constituency.
The network built by L is not subject to the access regulation that applies to Is network.
However, in order to focus on the most relevant cases, we assume (without loss of generality)
that L cannot implement an access price higher than the regulated access price. If both the
incumbent and the local authority builds an upgraded network, there is Bertrand competition
on the wholesale market for access.
Finally, events unfolds as follows. First, the regulator R decides of the price for the access
r to the existing network. Second, the value of k is realized. Third, incumbent operator I
decides whether to upgrade or not its network. Fourth, local authority L decides whether
to build a competing network. If it does, then it can decide the term of access to the local
public network newly created; if it doesnt, then broadband services might be provided by
the rms using the already existing network at the access price r decided by the regulator R.
The local authority is thus allowed to intervene and to duplicate the investment of I or
to invest when I fails to do so. We refer to this regime as the regime D (for duplication or
duopoly). We will compare that scenario with two other possible regulatory regimes.
In regime L, the incumbent is not investing (because either regulation forbids investment
or r is low enough to discourage it) and L decides to provide the service locally or not. The
3This cost may depend on the observable characteristics of the district such as its density for example.
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regime M (for monopoly) is one in which the local authority is not allowed to duplicate the
infrastructure. In this case, the local authority is allowed to invest in a network only if the
incumbent has not.4
3 Benchmark
As a preliminary step, assume that the incumbents and the local authoritys investment cost
are publicly known.
Let us rst analyze the investment decisions by the incumbent and the local authority.
At the last stage of the game, L decides whether to duplicate the network. Obviously, that
decision depends on the choice made by I at the previous stage. If I has not upgraded the
network, then L decides to build its own network if, and only if:
max
ar
W (a) + aD(a)  k  0: (1)
The left-hand side of (1) is the welfare of the local authority when it upgrades the network,
and sets optimally the access price for that network.5 The optimal access price is thus equal
to nil. Hence, condition (1) can then be rewritten as   k
W (0)
.
If I has upgraded the network, then the local authority is willing to duplicate the network
if, and only if:
max
ar
W (a) + aD(a)  k  W (r): (2)
The di¤erence with inequality (1) is the gain for the local authority if it decides not to
intervene and contents itself with broadband services being provided to its local constituency
at nal price r. Simple manipulations allow to rewrite inequality (2) as
k  k^(r) = [W (0) W (r)]: (3)
Let us now turn on to the decision faced by the local incumbent at the second stage of the
game. The incumbent is not willing to undertake the upgrading if it expects to make losses
from such a decision. Negative prots arise either because the level of demand for broadband
services is too low to cover the xed cost of the upgrading, or because the local authority
decides later on to bypass the incumbents network. Therefore, I invests provided that:
c
rD(r)
   k
W (0) W (r) : (4)
Situations in which the incumbent never invests (either because it is not economically
4An alternative would be to forbid completely the intervention of L but this would be dominated by
regime M since investment by I would be the same, but L would invest less.
5That welfare is the sum of customers surplus and the access revenues generated by the local public
network, minus the xed cost of duplication k; it does not account for the incumbents prot.
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viable or because the incumbent expects to be duplicated by the local authority) are of
limited interested. Therefore, we focus on cases in which inequality (4) is satised. As
established in the next lemma, we can safely consider that (4) holds for some values of the
access price r set by the regulator.
Lemma 1 There exists values of (r; ) such that c
rD(r)
<  < k
W (0) W (r) if and only if k > c.
Proof. This amounts to proving that, for some values of r, c
rD(r)
< k
W (0) W (r) or equivalently
that h(r)  W (r) + k
c
rD(r) W (0) > 0. We have: h0(r) = D(r)
c
[k   c  k"(r)]. Since "(:) is
increasing, h(:) is quasi-concave in r. Thus h (r) is positive for some values of r if and only
if h0(0) = (k   c)D(0) > 0, or k > c.
Social e¢ ciency solves the following trade-o¤. The incumbent is more e¢ cient than the
local authority to build the infrastructure. However, as opposed to the local authority, the
regulator cannot use taxation to nance the investment and must distort the access price
away from the marginal cost of access.
In a regime in which the incumbent invests, the access price rbb implemented by the
regulator is such that the incumbent exactly breaks even, or: rbbD(rbb) = c. Welfare is thus
equal to: W (rbb).
If, by contrast, the regulator lets the local authority undertake the investment, L imple-
ments an access price which maximizes the welfare of its constituency, which as we have seen,
leads to a nil access price. Welfare is thus equal to: W (0)  k.
Therefore, the rst-best investment rule is as follows: the incumbent invests at a regulated
access price rbb if and only if k  k^(rbb); otherwise, the local authority invests and sets a nil
access price on the new infrastructure.
In this framework where all the relevant information is available to all the actors, there are
various ways to implement the rst-best allocation. For instance, the regulator can dictate
which party has to undertake the investment. Or, R can let the local authority decide who
has to make the investment (but R keeps the power to set the access price if the incumbent
builds the infrastructure).
Alternatively, suppose that R provides the incumbent with the incentives to invest by
setting an access price equal to rbb, and allows the local authority to duplicate the incumbents
network. It is straightforward that this regulation triggers the socially optimal investment
choice at equilibrium of our game, i.e. Regime D implements the rst-best. By contrast,
both Regime M (which bans duplication) and Regime L (which prevents investment by the
incumbent) are sub-optimal under complete information.
The next proposition summarizes this benchmark.
Proposition 1 First, under complete information, at the social optimum, if k  k^(rbb) then
the incumbent invests and the regulated access price is rbb; otherwise, the local authority
invests and sets an access price equal to nil.
Second, allowing duplication (i.e. RegimeD) implements the rst-best allocation while Regime
L and M are sub-optimal.
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Key to the second part of Proposition 1 is the fact that, under complete information,
Ls intervention is perfectly anticipated by I and R and that R sets an access charge which
leaves no prot to the incumbent so that Ls and Rs objectives become perfectly aligned.
The next proposition shows that this logic extends to a more general informational setting.
Proposition 2 If, on the one hand, the regulator maximizes consumerswelfare, and, on the
other hand, the incumbent and the local authority share the same information, then allowing
duplication is socially preferable to any other regimes.
Proof. Consider any information structure such that I and L have the same information,
denoted by s. The access charge chosen under regime M is rM . Suppose that the regulator
chooses regime D with r = rM . Then, I invests when E fW (0)  k j sg  E fW (rM) j sg
and 0  E frMD (rM)  c j sg; L invests when E fW (0)  k j sg  E fW (rM) j sg, or
E fW (0)  k j sg  0 and 0 > E frMD (rM)  c j sg.
Regime D generates more investment than regimes I and D. Welfare is larger than in
regime L because I invests only when it brings more welfare than L. It is larger than in
regime I because L invests only when it brings more welfare.
In the current more general setting, Regime D may no longer implement the rst-best
allocation as the access charge chosen by the regulator may not be the best access charge
given the information set of the incumbent. The regulator may then try to improve the
outcome by relying on an incentive regulation scheme. We shall not pursue this line as our
main goal is, rather, to evaluate when allowing duplication is ine¢ cient.6
4 Curbing local activism to reduce ine¢ cient crowding-
out
We now consider that the regulator lacks information about the local authoritys cost of
building its own network. However, k is known both by the incumbent and the local authority
of that district. This highlights the fact that, at the time of devising the national regulatory
scheme, the regulator may lack knowledge about the local authoritiesopportunity cost for
the services.
Moreover, the following assumption is now made throughout this section: The regulated
access charge r does not depend on the level of demand  that prevails in the district. In
our framework, this is a short-cut to model the fact that in network industries the pricing
of infrastructure access by the incumbent is often required to be uniform across the national
territory (the so-called perequation scheme). Alternatively, R may lack reliable knowledge
about the level of demand that prevails in the district at the time of deciding the national
access tari¤.
6See our companion paper for an analysis of the issues raised by the possibilities of contracting between
the incumbent and the local authority.
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To streamline the analysis, consider that over the relevant range of demand parameter
the regulated access tari¤ is such that the incumbent makes prot if it invests and is not
duplicated: rD(r)  c. This therefore implies that there is a conict of interest between
the national regulator and the local authorities, i.e. their objectives are no longer perfectly
congruent.
The conjunction of these two assumptions makes the determination of the optimal regu-
latory regime a non-trivial issue.
4.1 Regimes of authorization
If the local authoritys cost were observable ex ante7 by the regulator, then R has simply to
establish an ex ante list of the district were duplication is allowed or not. A district where k is
such that W (0) k  W (r)+rD(r) c is allowed to duplicate the incumbents investment;
otherwise, the local authority is not allowed to duplicate. The incumbent then refrains from
investing in those cases where it anticipates that the local authority will duplicate. Symmetric
information between R and I implies that no ine¢ cient duplication arises at equilibrium. For
a given access tari¤ r, this ex ante rule implements the optimal outcome.
Proposition 3 When the regulator knows ex ante the local authoritys investment cost, for a
given access price r the optimal allocation can be implemented by establishing a regime of ex
ante authorization, i.e. an ex ante list of the districts which are allowed or not to duplicate
the incumbents network.
In many cases, though, the regulator may lack such a knowledge about the local author-
itys investment cost ex ante but that opportunity cost can be assessed ex post, i.e. k is
not observable ex ante, but is veriable ex post. Three types of direct intervention can be
envisioned:
 The regulator can systematically allow duplication, i.e. Regime D. Given that we focus
on cases where rD(r)  c, the local authority duplicates when W (0)  k  W (r).
 The regulator can implement a regime of ex post authorization(EPA), i.e. decide
whether to authorize duplication only once the local authoritys investment cost can be
ascertained. In that case, duplication is allowed ex post provided that W (0) k  c 
W (r) + rD(r)  c or W (0)  k  W (r) + rD(r).
 The regulator can systematically ban duplication, i.e. Regime M . Clearly, this regime
is dominated by Regime EPA.
Neither Regime D nor Regime EPA do implement the socially desirable outcome. How-
ever, none of these regimes dominate the other one. Regime D leads to excessive duplication
7That is, before the investment decision by the incumbent.
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by the local authority, which in turn yields an ine¢ cient crowding-out of the incumbents
investment. Indeed, the local authority cares only about the welfare of its constituency and
does not account for the incumbents foregone prot rD(r)   c. Regime EPA yields not
enough duplication by the local authority because the incumbent tends to invest too fre-
quently, which reduces the ex post gain associated to the intervention by the local authority.
>From an ex ante perspective, the welfare di¤erence between Regime D and Regime
EPA writes as follows (with k^(r)  rD(r) = W (0)  [W (r) + rD(r)]  0):
WD  WEPA =
Z k^(r)
k^(r) rD(r)
n
k^(r)  k   [rD(r)  c)]
o
dF (k):
When r is equal to rbb, as is the case in our benchmark, Regime D dominates. Otherwise,
the comparison is ambiguous and one regime or the other can be optimal.
4.2 Constraining the local authoritys intervention
The previous subsection has highlighted the di¢ culty to cope with the issue of duplication
through regimes of authorization. Moreover, by its mere design, Regime EPA requires to
be capable to assess at some point the local authoritys cost, an assumption which may
not be satised in practice. Indeed, this cost reects local taxation and public spending
considerations, as well as public debt management and political considerations. Based on
this observation, we now consider two other regulatory instruments that supplement a regime
with full authorization of duplication.
Consider the requirement that the incumbent be reimbursed a fraction  2 f0; 1g of its
investment cost when duplicated by the local authority.8 Moreover, if duplication arises,
then the regulator can impose a price-oor on the local authoritys network: that is, the
price to access Ls infrastructure cannot be lower than l  r.9 Thus, the incumbent decides
to invest as long as it expects not to be duplicated and the local authority duplicates when
k  [W (l) + lD (l) W (r)]  c. Expected welfare is thus given by:
~W (r; ; l) =
Z [W (l)+lD(l) W (r)] c
k
[W (l) + lD (l)  k] dF (k)
+
Z +1
[W (l)+lD(l) W (r)] c
[W (r) + rD(r)  c] dF (k):
The determination of the optimal price-oor and reimbursement policies (; l) is not en-
lightening. Let us rather determine some properties of the optimal policies.
Starting from Regime D with no reimbursement policy, implementing a price-oor is
8We assume here that the incumbent doesnt invest when it anticipates to be inactive. Otherwise, 
should be slightly below 1:
9As it should be clear, a price-cap has no bite in our context.
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optimal if:
@ ~W
@l
(r;  = 0; l = 0) / rD(r)  c 
F

k^ (r)

f

k^ (r)
 > 0: (5)
Imposing a price-oor has both a cost and a benet. The cost is that the service is provided
less e¢ ciently by the local authority when it invests and it is incurred with probability F

k^

.
The benet is that there is less ine¢ cient public investment, where the level of ine¢ ciency
is I 0s prot and the marginal e¤ect is captured by the density. A positive price oor is
then optimal only if the ine¢ ciency in investment decisions is large.10 Notice that, given
that k^ (r) = [W (0)   W (r)]  rD(r)   c, a necessary condition for (5) to hold is that
k^   c

f

k^

> F

k^

.
Whether a price-oor policy is optimal depends on the distribution of the local authoritys
cost of intervention. In particular it is not optimal when the incumbent prot from investing
is small.
In the subsequent analysis, we neglect the possibility of implementing a price-oor (and
expressions are modied accordingly) since this not be the most relevant policy in the case
of telecoms.
Starting from Regime D, implementing a full reimbursement policy is optimal if:
~W (r;  = 1; l = 0)  ~W (r;  = 0; l = 0)
=  
Z [W (0) W (r)]
[W (0) W (r)] c
fW (0)  k   [W (r) + rD(r)  c]g dF (k): (6)
Condition (6) shows that when the regulated access price leaves the incumbent with
no prot, then a reimbursement policy is not warranted. A regime with authorization of
duplication is optimal in that case.
Complications arise when the regulated access tari¤ departs from this break-even point,
which is the case if the regulator satises a uniform pricing constraint. For a district with a
large demand, so that the incumbent prot tends to be large in that district, a reimbursement
rule tends to be optimal.
Since revenue rD (r) is larger than cost c for investment to occur, a reimbursement
policy leads to more duplication than an ex post authorization regime. Interestingly, the
welfare di¤erence between a duplication regime and an ex post authorization regime rewrites
as follows:
~W (r;  = 1) WEPA =
Z [W (0) W (r)] c
[W (0) W (r)] rD(r)
fW (0)  k   [W (r) + rD(r)  c]g dF (k):
(7)
The right-hand side of (7) is always positive. Therefore, we immediately obtain:
10The condition(5) is su¢ cient if the hazard rate F (:)=f(:) is increasing.
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Proposition 4 A regime of ex post authorization is dominated by a regime with duplica-
tion and a reimbursement policy. However, if a regime with duplication is chosen, then a
reimbursement policy is not always optimal.
Proof. The integrand term in the RHS of equation (7) is non-zero only if c <  [W (0) W (r)] 
c since F (c) = 0: Suppose this holds. Then the value in the integrand is larger than
2c  rD(r) > 0: Thus the integrand is positive.
Notice that this conclusion for the full reimbursement policy relies on the assumption
that public transfers involve no social cost. If public funds imply distortions and social
ine¢ ciencies, a reimbursement policy will imply a cost c for the collectivity where  > 1 and
a deadweight loss which would tend to favour the regime of ex post authorization whenever
it is feasible.
5 Duplication risk and risk premium
This section is devoted to the analysis of our game taking into account, again, some asym-
metries of information between the incumbent and the local authority. However, the infor-
mational gap is now between, on one side, the regulator and the incumbent, and, on the
other side, the local authority. To keep consistency with the previous section, assume that
only L does know its investment cost k. Note that superior information of the incumbent,
for instance on the level of demand, would not invalidate our results as I would still be able
to anticipate the behavior of L. Therefore, we keep assuming that the level of demand  is
public information.
Without anticipating too much on the analysis, the crucial di¤erence between this infor-
mational setting and the one developed in the previous section is that, now, the incumbent
cannot perfectly foresee the local authoritys duplication decision. Duplication may then
arise with a strictly positive probability at equilibrium, leading the regulator to compensate
the incumbent for this risk in order to stimulate private investment.
When k  k^(r), the local authority bypasses the existing network and builds its own
public network. Assuming duplication is authorized, the regulator has two options: trigger
investment by the incumbent rm, or not.
In the rst case, dene the access price rD such that the incumbent is just indi¤erent
between building a network or not, that is:h
1  F (k^(rD))
i
rDD(rD) = c:
The regulator then sets r = rD to induce investment. Of course rD may not exist, in which
case Regime D is not feasible and resume to regime L. To focus on the interesting cases, we
assume from now on that rD exists.
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Expected welfare in the regime with duplication writes as follows:
WD =
Z k^(rD)
k
[W (0)  k   c] dF (k) +
Z +1
k^(rD)
[W (rD) + rDD(rD)  c] dF (k);
=
Z k^(rD)
k
[W (0)  k] dF (k) +
Z +1
k^(rD)
W (rD)dF (k):
Another option is to discourage the incumbent from investing by setting too low an access
price (for instance r < rD); only the local authority does invest, provided its cost parameter
is su¢ ciently low, or, formally, provided that k  W (0). Expected welfare in that case can
thus be written as follows: WL =
R W (0)
k
[W (0)  k] dF (k).
Interestingly, the comparison of the two regulatory policies turns out to be unambiguous:
Proposition 5 Under asymmetric information on the local authoritys cost parameter only,
the regulator always prefers to induce investment by the incumbent with duplication than to
prevent investment by the incumbent, i.e. Regime D dominates Regime L (when it induces
investment by the incumbent).
Proof. Suppose rD exists and rewrite WD as follows:
WD =
Z k^(rD)
k
[W (0)  k] dF (k) +
Z +1
k^(rD)
W (rD)dF (k);
= WL +
Z W (0)
k^(rD)
[W (rD)  W (0) + k] dF (k) +
Z +1
W (0)
W (rD)dF (k):
Obviously, the second integral in the last expression is positive. Notice also that, for any r,
k^(r)  W (0) and that k^(r)  k  W (0) is equivalent to [W (0)  W (r)]  k  W (0).
Therefore, the rst integral is also positive. We thus conclude that WD > WL.
The next step is to determine when it is optimal to ban the intervention of the local
authority (Regime M). Obviously, there is a trade-o¤. On the one hand, the intervention
of the local authority arises provided that its cost parameter is not too high and allows to
benet from a reduced nal price. On the other hand, since the incumbent can no longer
perfectly anticipate the local authoritys ex post intervention due to asymmetric information,
the incumbents ex ante incentive to invest in the network upgrade degrades, thereby forcing
the regulator to increase the access price.
Formally, if there is a ban on the intervention by the local authority, the regulator provides
the incumbent with the incentives to upgrade the network by setting the access price rM = rbb
(such that: rbbD(rbb)  c = 0). Expected welfare is thus given by: WM = W (rbb).
Comparing WM and WD, we obtain the following conclusion:
Proposition 6 When there is asymmetric information on the local authoritys cost parame-
ter only, it is preferable to ban duplication and induce investment by the incumbent (strictly
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if duplication arises with positive probability in Regime D), i.e. regime M dominates regime
D.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 6 states that when the incumbent invests and there is some duplication, it
would be better to simply induce investment with no duplication. The result is due to the
fact that inducing the incumbent to invest requires compensating it for the risk of duplication
by raising the access charge. Compared to setting rbb with no duplication, this increase in
access charge o¤sets any benets that may arise from the local authoritys intervention.
As opposed to the previous case of symmetric information, duplication is not always
e¢ cient because rD > rbb. There exists a range of cost k where duplication occurs while it
would be more e¢ cient to let the incumbent invest but with the break-even access charge
rbb.
The general conclusion is thus that with symmetric information between the regulator
and the incumbent, but imperfect information on the local authoritys opportunity cost of
intervention, the optimal regulation takes the following form:
 For low values of cost c, the incumbent invests with an access charge set so as to just
generate fair return on investment and local intervention is forbidden.
 For large c, the local authority invests.
The threshold c^ for which the local authority is indi¤erent between investing or not is
solution of:
W (rbb) = E fmax (W (0)  k; 0)g :
It is larger than the maximal value for which regime D would be feasible:
c^ > max
r
h
1  F

k^ (r)
i
rD (r) :
6 Technological externalities and electronic dumping
In this section, we introduce another relevant ingredient which may lead to ine¢ cient dupli-
cation: externalities between regions. We focus on two kinds of externalities, technological
ones and externalities linked to a form of (scal) competition between districts.
To discuss this we consider the case of two districts, 1 and 2; each district i is characterized
by parameters i and ci where ci is interpreted as the cost for the incumbent to develop the
infrastructure in district i alone. We assume that the demand-adjusted cost is larger in
district 1 than in district 2: c2
2
 c1
1
.
To simplify matters we focus on the externality exerted by duplication in district 2 on
district 1 by assuming that there is no local authority in district 1 that can invest in in-
frastructure. Moreover we assume that the regulator maximizes total consumers surplus;
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this allows focusing on ine¢ ciencies not related to conicting objectives between the regu-
lator and the local authorities as a whole. The local authority in district 2 maximizes the
surplus of the initial population in its own district: it considers only the immobile agents
even if, ex post, mobile agents turn out to settle in district 2. This assumption builds on
the fact the local authority is a representative (possibly elected) of the inhabitants of the
district, and, therefore, is subject to the inuence of the agents living in the district at the
moment of making choices.
We work under the assumption of a unique access charge nationwide. Indeed, the common
practice, in particular for broadband access, is to have a unique access charge across all
districts, referred to as a universal service obligation or USO. Note that allowing the local
authority to intervene on market conditions amounts to deviating from a general principle
of USO, for this implies di¤erential access conditions. Although our objective in this paper
is not to develop the analysis of USO we want to stress that it is not clear whether there is
any rational for USO once local intervention is allowed.11
The timing is as follows: the regulator chooses an access price r; the incumbent decides
whether to undertake the network upgrade in each district; the local authority in district 2
decides to invest of not in the infrastructure.
Duplication may prevent the incumbent from exploiting scale economy at the level of
the national territory, thereby creating ine¢ ciencies. Indeed, it was assumed so far that the
cost of providing the infrastructure was xed in each district. In practice, though, there are
common xed costs in developing infrastructures. To illustrate this e¤ect, we consider the
case of two districts with a technological externality. Formally, we assume that ci is the cost
of developing the infrastructure in district i only, while c1 + c2    is the cost of developing
the infrastructure in both districts. Thus,  can be seen as a common xed cost.
Consider rst regime M . Then, the incumbent builds the infrastructure in both districts
if:
(1 + 2) rD (r)  (c1 + c2   )  0;
1rD (r)  (c1   )  0;
2rD (r)  (c2   )  0:
The smallest regulated access charge rM is then solution of:
rMD (rM) = max

c1   
1
;
c1 + c2   
1 + 2

<
c1
1
:
Consider now regime D. Then, duplication occurs at r = rM if k2 < 2 [W (0) W (rM)].
When this is the case, the regulator needs to set a price r = rD > rM such that 1rDD (rD) =
11The problem is similar with the one of USO under liberalization and competition, namely one of cream-
skimming.
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c1. Thus, duplication forces to raise the price in district 1 to compensate for the foregone
scale economies. Then we obtain:
Proposition 7 With scale economy, there is a range of the local authoritys cost parameter
for which it is optimal to ban duplication.
Proof. Duplication is e¢ cient if 1W (rD) + 2W (0)   k2 > (1 + 2)W (rM). Thus, du-
plication should be forbidden when: 2 [W (0) W (rM)] + 1 [W (rD) W (rM)] < k2 <
2 [W (0) W (rM)].
Another potential source of ine¢ ciency is grounded in the competition between districts.
To get an idea on the possible interactions between districts in their investment and pricing
choices, let us amend our framework as follows.
Suppose that on top of the population living in each district, there is a mass of mobile
agents, either wealthy consumers or rms, who choose their location according to the pro-
posals made by the districts. To keep things simple, we assume that those mobile agents
have the same demand as the standard ones but with a coe¢ cient ^ and that those agents
are initially located in district 1.12 Moreover, we take the assumption that the mobile agents
cannot modify the rankings of the cost/demand ratio across districts, i.e. c2
2
 c1
1+^
 c1
1
.
Since the policy chosen in each district may trigger some mobility, there are some exter-
nalities between districts. More precisely, if there is no migration from the rst to the second
district, the average cost for a given access price r is given by c1
(1+^)D(r)
. In case of mobility,
this costs rises to c1
1D(r)
. Therefore, the choice of the regulated access charge must take into
account the ex post choice of the district 2 and of the mobile agents. This may be another
rationale for banning or allowing duplication.
To focus on the most relevant cases, assume from now on that the regulator wants to
ensure that investment takes place in district 1. In the absence of a public decision-maker in
district 1, this means that the incumbent must be given incentives to invest in this district.
In a regime without duplication, setting an access price rM such that (1+^)rMD(rM) = c1
triggers private investment both in district 1 and in district 2. Consumerswelfare is then
given by:
S(rM) = (1 + ^ + 2)W (rM):
Any other regulated access price is either unnecessarily high or triggers private investment
only in district 2 (together with mobility of the mobile consumers).
Assume now that duplication is allowed. Given a regulated access price r, the local
authority in district 2 decides to duplicate the incumbent provided that:
max
a2r
2W (a2) + (2 + ^)a2D(a2)  k2  2W (r):
12Mobile agents in district 2 would not migrate and are therefore aggregated in the demand in disctrict 2.
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Dene consequently k^2(r) as the threshold of the local authoritys cost below which duplica-
tion occurs and a^2 (r) as the access price implemented in district 2 in that case:
a^2 (r) = min

r;
2
2 + ^
D(a^2)
 D0(a^2)

:
As above, if k2 is known to be below k^2 (rM) ; a regime D requires to set the price in
district 1 at the level rD > rM such that 1rDD (rD) = c1: Allowing duplication involves,
on the one hand, a higher regulated access price on district 1 because the rm faces a risk
of duplication, and, on the other hand, a lower access price in district 2, which benets the
mobile citizens on top of those living initially in district 2. While the fact that mobile citizens
benet makes a di¤erence, we still obtain:
Proposition 8 With a mobile population, there is a range of the local authoritys cost para-
meter for which it is optimal to ban duplication.
Proof. Duplication is e¢ cient if
1W (rD) +

2 + ^

W (a^2 (rD)) + (2 + ^)a^2 (rD)D(a^2 (rD))  k2 >

1 + 2 + ^

W (rM) :
Thus, duplication should be forbidden when:
1W (rD) +

2 + ^

W (a^2 (rD)) + (2 + ^)a^2 (rD)D(a^2 (rD)) 

1 + 2 + ^

W (rM)
< k2 < 2W (a^2 (rM)) + (2 + ^)a^2 (rM)D(a^2 (rM))  2W (rM)
Then we have
1W (rD) +

2 + ^

W (a^2 (rD)) + (2 + ^)a^2 (rD)D(a^2 (rD)) 

1 + 2 + ^

W (rM)
< 2W (a^2 (rM)) + (2 + ^)a^2 (rM)D(a^2 (rM))  2W (rM)
+1W (rD) + ^W (0) 

1 + ^

W (rM)
Remind that 1rDD (rD) + ^:0 =

1 + ^

rMD (rM) = c1. But our assumption on r implies
that the welfare W is a concave of the revenue rD (r) on the relevant range of price. Thus
1W (rD) + ^W (0)  

1 + ^

W (rM) < 0 which implies that the condition is satised for
an interval of k2:
More generally, when the regulator is uncertain about the duplication decision by the local
authority, the only way to trigger private investment in district 1 is to set the regulated access
price at level rD: even if mobile citizens move to district 2, the incumbent is then willing
to undertake the investment in district 1. Clearly when the regulator is eager to preserve
investment in district 1; a ban on duplication is optimal when the gain from duplication is
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small, thus when the likelihood of duplication is small or local investment cost lies in the
interval identied above.
7 Conclusion
Investment by local government may help fostering fast development of new infrastructures
and reaching a large coverage of population. As such it may be an important element of
public policies aiming at reducing the potential gap between highly competitive zones and
less competitive ones. Still public policy should guard itself from potential crowding out of
e¢ cient private investment, which may occur when public investment is not restricted to
areas where private investment is decient.
Our paper helps understanding the issues at stake by focusing on situations where condi-
tions for competition are not met, but it is not obvious whether a regulated private monopoly
dominates a local public investment. Thus our conclusions are valid in such grey areas where
competition is not e¤ective enough.
We identied three key dimensions that should be considered with special assumptions
when designing rules governing the intervention of local authorities.One is the risk born
by private investors, that may refrain them from investing. Costly ex-ante weakening of
regulation is then required to restore investment incentives. Our results suggest that when
this is the sole distortion, the benets of local intervention doesnt outweigh the cost of lenient
regulation.
Other issues relate to di¤erences between the motives of the local authorities and the
social welfare. Such di¤erences in objectives may result from a lack of appraisal of foregone
prots at the local level as in section 3, or from various forms of externalities as in section 6.
In particular, competition between collectivities trying to propose the best environment for
mobile factors may lead to excessive investment. In discussing these issues we ignored political
economy or prestige considerations that may lead politicians to invest excessively in advanced
technologies at the expense of less rewarding by more useful local goods. Our discussion of the
regulation with conicting objectives doesnt clearly support banning duplication but rather
suggests that some form of control and limits on the local interventions may help improve
e¢ ciency.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Of course, if there is no investment in Regime D, banning duplication has no e¤ect since the
regulatory choice is only between allowing the incumbent to invest with no duplication, or
no investment by the incumbent and investment by the local authority. Assume from now
on that there is investment in Regime D.
One has to show that WM  WD is always positive when duplication arises with a strictly
positive probability under Regime D. We have:
K(c) =WM  WD = W (rbb) 
"Z k^(rD)
k
[W (0)  k] dF (k) +
Z +1
k^(rD)
W (rD)dF (k)
#
:
Note rst that when c = 0, then rD = rbb = 0 and k^(rD) = 0. Therefore, K (0) = 0.
Now let us di¤erentiate K(:) with respect to c:
K 0(c) =  D(rbb)@rbb
@c
+ D(rD)
@rD
@c
h
1  F (k^(rD))
i
:
Remark that rbb and rD are increasing functions of c. Let us consider rst the denition
of rbb. It is the smallest solution of the following relationship: rbbD(rbb) c = 0. It exists for
c less than the monopoly prot. Using the implicit function theorem, it is therefore direct to
conclude that:
@rbb
@c
=
1
[D(rbb) + rbbD0(rbb)]
> 0;
since rbb  am = argmaxa aD(a).
Similarly, rD is dened as the smallest solution of: [1 F (k^(rD)]rDD(rD)  c = 0. Since
for c = 0 the solution is rD = 0, and using a continuity argument, there are solutions to the
previous equation for small c and a straightforward argument shows that the smallest one is
increasing with c. Notice that rbb exists if rD exists.
There may be upward discontinuities of rD. At such point K (:) has an upward disconti-
nuity. Now, where rD is continuous, it is di¤erentiable and the derivative of the gross prot
function is increasing (since aD  am). More precisely, we have:
@rD
@c
=
1


D(rD)(1  F (k^(rD))) + rD @@r

D(r)(1  F (k^(r))

r=rD
 > 0:
We can now rewrite the expression for K 0(c) as follows:
K 0(c) =
 D(rbb)
D(rbb) + rbbD0(rbb)
+
D(rD)(1  F (k^))
D(rD)(1  F (k^(rD))) + rD @@r (D(r)

1  F (k^(r)))

r=rD
:
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Now, using the positivity of the denominator, we can state that:
K 0(c)  0 , D(rbb) + rbbD
0(rbb)
D(rbb)

D(rD)(1  F (k^(rD))) + rD @@r

D(r) (1  F (k^(r)))

r=rD
D(rD)(1  F (k^(rD)))
;
, 1  "(rbb)  1 + @
@r

D(r)(1  F (k^(r)))

r=rD
rD
D(rD)(1  F (k^(rD)))
;
,  "(rbb) 
rD

D0(rD)(1  F (k^(rD))) +D(rD) @@r

1  F (k^(rD))

r=rD

D(rD)(1  F (k^(rD)))
;
,  "(rbb)   "(rD) + rD
@
@r

1  F (k^(r))

r=rD
(1  F (k^(rD)))
:
Since rbb  rD and "(:) is increasing,  "(rbb)   "(rD). Moreover:
@
@r

1  F (k^(r))

r=rD
=  dk^
@r
(rD)f(k^(rD)) =  D(rD)f(k^(rD))  0:
So K 0(c)  0 when rD is continuous. Thus K (c) is nondecreasing with c. Using the fact that
K(0) = 0, we obtain that K (c) is non-negative on its domain.
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